משרד: 02-9605631    להזמנות גדולות: 052-8990321    פקס: 153-2-9605631
כללי

This chapter moves from the substantive law of insanity and automatism to the rules and practices of evidence and evidence. It analyzes how requests for relief from mental incapacity are regulated. The rules of evidence and procedure relating to automatism differ from those relating to insanity, and in a manner that reasonably relieves anyone. Two main points are discussed in this chapter. The first is that more than one type of knowledge influences the evidentiary practices that accompany exculpatory incompetence. Specialized knowledge or expertise on “insanity” and non-specialized or lay knowledge is relevant to understanding how exculpatory claims of incapacity are decided in criminal law. The second main point is that the rules of evidence and evidence that apply to insanity and automatism reflect the different epochs in which they have been formalized by informal practices. While the rules of insanity crystallized in the era of “reconstructive” criminal procedure, the emergence of a doctrine of discrete automatism in the second half of the twentieth century coincided with a version of adversarial criminal procedure that dealt with due process and the efficient handling of criminal cases. The basis for this can be found in the American criminal justice system. Most crimes in the United States are defined in a way that implicitly distinguishes an actus reus – a culpable act – from a mens rea – or guilty state of mind. For example, the New York Penal Code defines second-degree murder as causing the death of a person (culpable act) with intent to cause the death of a person (state of mind). N.Y.

Penal § 125.25(1) In contrast, second-degree manslaughter is defined as negligent causation of a person`s death (culpable act) (mental state). N.Y. Penal 125.15(1). Given how adversarial criminal cases developed during this period, one particular aspect of medical expert`s evidence of insanity stands out in my study of OBPs – its largely unbiased taste. The OBP trial records give a palpable sense of the fundamental acceptance or non-contestation of this evidence, which underlies the specific issue of a particular person and prosecution. This palpable fundamental acceptance underscores the broader social cache enjoyed by medical knowledge in the nineteenth century. A number of court records contain more than one medical expert, and there appear to have been significant referrals between experts (for example, “I agree with Dr. Bucknill that business losses, hereditary imperfections and habitual alcohol use, and a blow to the head would likely lead to insanity.”59 This reference extended beyond the still porous boundary between the expert and the layman and included the latter`s testimony about the insane condition of an individual.

In the hearing of lay witnesses such as parents, siblings, owners of licensed facilities, comrades, staff and others, medical witnesses spoke of insanity in the family (“insanity is notoriously hereditary”60), previous injuries (“There is a very clear sign on the upper part of his head. This injury would affect the brain very decisively at that time”61) and the behavior at the time of the crime (“This only confirms the opinion I had formed that he was not in good health”62). The totality of the evidence supported conclusions such as: “I have heard much more about him today than before – the general evidence” [sic] is that his mind is disturbed. 63 These referrals – between experts and between experts and non-experts, between the time of the crime (and even before) and the time of trial – created a complex mixture of the particular and the general, and gave critical weight. for the expertise of “madness” in a particular case. Legislative reforms that provide a range of elimination options can easily be interpreted as addressing equity and human rights concerns about indefinite hospitalization. The criticism of indefinite detention under the 1964 Act was manifold: it could mean a longer prison sentence than the defendant faced if convicted of the crime, and it may not have been an appropriate response to the condition that led to the objection of insanity.158 These considerations meant that there was little reason for defence counsel to make an admission of insanity. except in cases where the accused has been charged, a serious offence (which has no doubt distorted the public`s understanding of how the insanity law works).

Tags:
X